Container ship Nora is currently in the port of Kalundborg after being detained for nearly a month.
It has been inspected by the Danish Emergency Management Agency with a specialist hazmat unit, and the National Special Crime Unit (NSK) is still investigating the enormous vessel.
Until now, very little information has been available about Nora, which is suspected of being connected to Iranian shadow fleet networks. The ship has, among other things, been sanctioned by the USA for these connections.
Danwatch can now reveal that Nora is sailing on forged papers, and that the ship’s senior crew members are seven Iranians and a Russian second officer. This is shown by leaked documents from Russia, which Danwatch has obtained in collaboration with the Dossier Center.
They are all currently in Kalundborg. It is unknown why the ship is in Denmark to begin with. It remains unknown what the ship was doing in the Baltic Sea, but port data shows that it was last located in Russia.
Bjarne Cæsar Skinnerup has more than 27 years of experience as a pilot in Danish waters and now works for the state-owned pilotage service DanPilot. He says it is “bloody unusual” to see an Iranian container ship in Danish waters.
“I probably have 5,000 pilotage assignments behind me, and I have only worked with an Iranian ship in Denmark once before. It was a tanker, and that was about 15 years ago,” he says.
He says that Iranians have a reputation for being “good sailors,” but cannot understand what a container ship with an Iranian crew would be doing in these waters.
Danwatch can now also report that Nora has been provided falsified mandatory certificates by a shady company with a false address in Singapore.
Among the certificates are documents suggesting that the ship could be carrying dangerous cargo such as chemicals.
Under international conventions and laws, ships are required to hold a wide range of valid documents covering everything from insurance to safety, manning and the environment.
Ships without valid papers can, according to authorities and experts, pose a particularly serious risk of environmental disasters and hybrid attacks, as Danwatch has also previously reported.
Changed flag from island nation to Iran
The ship’s documents bear stamps and signatures from the authorities of the African island nation of the Comoros. However, the ship has never been registered there, even though it has been sailing under the Comorian flag.
Nora changed its flag from the Comoros to Iran in early February, after the Danish Maritime Authority discovered that the island nation had no knowledge of the ship. On the European database Equasis, Nora’s flag history now shows “Comoros FALSE”.
The mysterious company behind the documents is called Maritime Classification Bureau (MCB). It describes itself as a classification society that inspects and ensures ships’ safety is in order, and issues certificates and insurance on behalf of flag states.
However, there is strong evidence that MCB is a fictitious company issuing documents on behalf of these authorities without authorisation.
All of the ship’s crew certificates and other permits are signed by a person who only identifies themselves as “Thompson.” They have all been issued by MCB on behalf of the Comoros, which — as noted — has denied any connection to the ship.
Among the documents, there is also an insurance agreement with the sanctioned Russian insurance company Ingosstrakh, which has previously been linked to Russia’s shadow fleet in a number of media outlets, including Danwatch.
Bjarne Cæsar Skinnerup, who through his work is accustomed to checking ships’ certificates, is shocked that Nora has forged so many documents.
“I have never heard anything like it,” he says.
Fake permit for dangerous cargo
The leaked documents show that one of the ship’s forged papers is a permit to carry certain categories of dangerous cargo, including some types of chemicals.
These specifically include highly corrosive and toxic chemicals, but not flammable or explosive goods.
This may be one reason why authorities are detaining the ship and inspecting it in hazmat suits, according to naval captain and independent defence analyst Jens Wenzel Kristoffersen.
He is highly suspicious of Nora and its cargo overall.
“This is the kind of ship where you have to check every single container on board. I hope that is what NSK is in the process of doing,” he says.
Then there is the crew. Jens Wenzel Kristoffersen believes that, given the current security situation, authorities must remain open to the possibility that there is more going on than meets the eye.
The documents show that Nora has been crewed by Iranian sailors on all voyages since March 2024.
“The purpose could be many things, but we are entering speculative territory. It could be that it is meant to support Russia’s or Iran’s regime in some way,” he says.
There is no documentation for this at present. However, the presence of a Russian-Iranian crew in the Baltic Sea is conspicuous, and there is a good chance that Danish security services view it the same way, says Jens Wenzel Kristoffersen.
“I imagine that identity checks have been carried out on the crew by both NSK and others. The Russian second officer also stands out. You no longer know whether someone like him could have been planted by Russia,” the defence analyst says.
Danwatch has presented the findings to NSK. In an email, they state:
“NSK can confirm that a police operation is currently under way involving the container ship. NSK does not wish to comment further at this time.”
Address on a construction site
The responsible classification company MCB claims to have been active in the industry since 2000.
However, their website was only created in 2023 and contains neither contact details nor any information about employees or owners.
The company lists an address in Singapore on its website, but the building at that address was demolished in 2023 and previously belonged to Singapore’s maritime authority.
Elsewhere on the website, a city in Panama is listed, but without a street name or further details.
The company has never been registered with any of the organisations under which legitimate classification societies operate. Furthermore, it is not possible to look up ships in MCB’s database, which is otherwise standard practice in the industry.
It is therefore not possible to verify whether Nora appears in MCB’s own records.
It has, however, been possible for Danwatch to find the Iranian ship Nora in the register of another company. This company, Maritime Bureau of Classification — MBC, and not MCB — claims to carry out the same type of work as MCB. And like MCB, this company’s website also has no contact details or real addresses.
Danwatch has attempted to contact MCB, but their main email address rejects messages. It has not been possible to obtain a response before publication from the other email addresses. MBC has also proven impossible to contact.
