On March 1, 2018, Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, delivered a sensational speech in Moscow to all the country’s political leaders.

He announced a series of new nuclear weapons systems that would once and for all lead the country into the 21st century and bring Russia a step ahead in the arms race against the West.

“Nobody wanted to listen to us. So listen now,” Putin said, addressing those Western leaders who also might be listening.

What Vladimir Putin didn’t say much about, however, was how extensive a modernization of the country’s nuclear weapons complex Russia was already undertaking.

A gigantic modernization that had been in the works for more than a decade, and which was already well underway while Putin stood there at the podium in Moscow in 2018.

Now Danwatch, in collaboration with German Der Spiegel, can for the first time reveal previously unknown details about the enormous upgrade of the military infrastructure at Russia’s most protected facilities.

Together we have analyzed more than two million documents relating to Russian military procurement that Danwatch systematically retrieved from a public database over a period of many months. The Russian authorities have gradually restricted access to the database, but we managed to circumvent these restrictions by using a veriety of digital techniques, including a network of servers located in Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

The documents reveal how numerous new facilities have been built across all of Russia: Entire bases have been almost leveled and rebuilt from the ground up; hundreds of new barracks, watchtowers, control centers and storage buildings have been erected; and several kilometers of underground tunnels have been excavated.

The level of detail in the material is now causing several experts to raise alarms about a Russian security breach that could potentially make the large new nuclear weapons bases vulnerable to attack.

Among the millions of documents, Danwatch has found hundreds of original blueprints of the Strategic Missile Forces’ bases near the small town of Yasny, that have since 2019 been equipped with the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle – one of Russia’s new nuclear delivery systems that plays a central role in President Putin’s ambitions to put Russian in front in an arms race against the West.

In collaboration with Der Spiegel, we can now tell how the documents reveal highly sensitive details about some of the world’s most sensitive facilities.

First time since the 1970s

Few people know the details of Russian nuclear forces like Danish-born Hans M. Kristensen, and he calls it “absolutely incredible” that it has been possible to find this kind of information about Russia’s nuclear weapons facilities.

As director of the Nuclear Information Project at The Federation of American Scientists, an American nonprofit think tank with a strong focus on nuclear disarmament, Hans M. Kristensen has closely followed the development of nuclear powers’ arsenals for several decades.

“Your research is the deepest into the structure of these facilities that I have seen in the public domain. And we have to go all the way back to the buildings and systems of the 60s and 70s, where I remember seeing similar blueprints. Seeing it on these new systems, that’s a whole new chapter,” he says.

The many documents first and foremost reveal the scope of the Russian modernization. They show deliveries of enormous quantities of steel, sand, cement, bricks and insulation. But also more sensitive things like IT systems, electrical installations and routing of water, heating and ventilation.

There are detailed descriptions of the security systems: Three layers of electric fences along the bases’ outer perimeter, sensors for seismic activity and radioactivity, explosion-proof doors and windows, reinforced concrete buildings, and alarm systems with magnetic contacts and infrared sensors. In some cases, even the type and locations of internal surveillance cameras on the buildings are specified.

The documents also reveal the facilities’ internal layout in great detail. They describe where the soldiers eat, sleep and use the toilet. It also describes where they relax, and what exercise equipment they use (primarily treadmills and hand weights), what games they play to pass the time (chess and checkers) as well as what signs hang on the walls (“Stop! Turn around! Forbidden zone!” or “The Military Oath” or “Rules for shoe care”). They describe which rooms of the basements store the protective gear, and where the weapons cabinets stand. And it’s written explicitly where the control rooms are located, and which buildings are connected to each other via underground tunnels.

“Material like this is the ultimate intelligence,” says Philip Ingram, former Colonel and leader of the 1 Military Intelligence Battalion in the British Army.

“If you can understand how the electricity is conducted or where the water comes from, and you can see how the different things are connected in the systems, then you can identify strengths and weaknesses and find a weak point to attack,” he says.

Serious lapse in procedures

In December 2020, the Russian parliament adopted a new law that was supposed to tighten the rules for public procurement for the military, after the authorities had learned that military secrets were being shared far too often in tender materials.

Around that time, Russia’s Ministry of Defense also created a new tender database for military purchases that was would be closed to the public and only be available to vetted Russian businesses.

Nevertheless, officials in Russian military construction companies have continued to share sensitive documents in the public database. Danwatch and Der Spiegel have identified sensitive blueprints for the strategic nuclear weapons bases attached to tenders as recently as the summer of 2024.

”That you were able to find this tells me that there has been a serious lapse in processes and procedures in Russia,” says Philip Ingram.

“Documents like these for extremely sensitive defense projects should never have been publicly available in any way, shape, or form. Something like that is enormously valuable,” he says.

That assessment is shared by Tom Røseth, an expert in Russian security policy and chief instructor of intelligence studies at the Norwegian Staff College, the military academy of Norways Armed Forces.

“This is information that Russia would obviously want to keep hidden. It’s not that the information reduces the facilities’ value, but it does make them potentially more vulnerable,” he says.

Russia’s modernization of its nuclear forces is something that is closely monitored by Western intelligence agencies, according to the sources that Danwatch and Der Spiegel have spoken with. This is also the case for Denmark.

“The Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) follows the development in Russia’s military capabilities closely – including the development in Russia’s nuclear facilities. Russia has become more dependent on its nuclear weapons and will give them a more prominent role as deterrence against the West. This is due to the wear and tear of Russian conventional forces,” the DDIS writes in a statement to Danwatch.

In order to protect its capabilities, the military intelligence service does not wish to comment of specific military facilities in Russia.

A fundamental shift in security policy

The documents that Danwatch and Der Spiegel have uncovered highlight that Russia’s modernization of the strategic nuclear weapons forces is real, and that there is very concrete action behind the lofty words about new weapon types and infrastructure, according to Tom Røseth.

At a time when Russia is waging a war of aggression in Europe, and the European countries are increasing defense spending significantly, he believes it is in the public interest to know what is actually happening at the Russian nuclear bases.

“It’s important that we have a correct understanding of the situation, because there are still many who don’t fully recognize the situation Europe is in now, which is a fundamental shift in security policy,” says Tom Røseth.

“Therefore it’s important to show that Russia has modernized its nuclear arsenal. They have, after all, threatened with nuclear weapons regularly during the Ukraine war. It has public relevance that Russia is capable – and it’s even more important because they have adjusted their nuclear doctrine and now have a lower threshold for the use of nuclear weapons,” he says.

To Hans M. Kristensen, however, the Russian modernization efforts first and foremost represents a much needed replacement of the old Soviet era systems – and is not something that alters the fragile balance between the superpowers in any meaningful way.

Nevertheless, it’s necessary to monitor the development at the Russian bases closely. Especially after the major international treaties that are supposed to limit the number of certain missile types and nuclear warheads have fallen apart, and the built-in mechanisms for conducting inspections at the opponent’s nuclear facilities have been put on hold. Officially, there has not been a single on-site inspection between the United States and Russia since April 2020.

In light of that, documents like those that Danwatch and Der Spiegel have found can play a crucial role in understanding Russia’s intentions with their nuclear weapons program, says Hans M. Kristensen.

“It’s important to find out what the Russians are doing. It’s important to understand what the intention of their strategic systems is. Is there something in the infrastructure that allows you to better understand their doctrine and how they talk about their doctrine? Is what they say actually real?,” he says.

“It can be very dangerous if you overreact in this domain. So in that context, something like this can be of great importance.”

The last resort

According to sources in European security circles, Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces form the backbone of the country’s three-legged nuclear deterrent.

In addition to the heavy nuclear bombs that the Missile Forces can launch from buried silos or vehicles, Russia also has air- and sea-based nuclear weapons that can be launched from special bomber aircraft or submarines.

Over 50,000 soldiers are part of the Missile Forces, which are divided into three armies, 12 divisions and more than 40 regiments.

According to experts, the close to 900 operational nuclear warheads at the missile bases, and the intercontinental missiles that can launch them, have more than anything a psychological significance. These are weapons that can theoretically be used. But most experts agree that any use of them can quickly escalate to a devastating nuclear war of global scale.

Perhaps that is why Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces see themselves as a last resort, a purely destructive force that only comes into play when all hope is lost. Their official motto is as poetic as it is terrifying:

“After us – silence.”

Experts in the Western world still see the risk of nuclear war as being low, however, and even Vladimir Putin has no interest in an all-out nuclear war that would inevitably also destroy Russia. He has previously emphasized that Russia will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and that it is only preparing the ability to respond in case of an attack.

“Yes, it looks like we are sitting on our hands and waiting until someone uses nuclear weapons against us. Well, yes, this is what it is. But then any aggressor should know that retaliation is inevitable and they will be annihilated,” Putin added.

The threat of mutual destruction is generally believed to have been crucial for stability between the superpowers for many decades. But it also gives the nuclear powers other advantages.

“Without this threat, Russian foreign policy would look very different,” says an experienced source from the security apparatus in a NATO country, who only speaks on condition of anonymity. Had it not been for that trump card, it’s not given that Russia would have attacked Ukraine, the source believes.

Even though the two bases in Yasny are now on active combat alert, the security breach could mean that the Russian authorities will have to investigate whether some changes should be made to the facilities, says Tom Røseth.

“They will certainly evaluate whether they can reduce the vulnerabilities that has been revealed. That could for example be new laying new cable routes, or reinforcing certain places with concrete. The problem is that it costs a lot of money to change the infrastructure at these facilities,” he says.

Danwatch and Der Spiegel have reached out to the Russian Defense Ministry for a comment on whether they regard it as a security breach that blueprints have been released to a public database. We have also asked whether they assess that the documents would reveal the bases’ vulnerabilities.

They have not responded to our inquiries.